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Bogard: Bogard: Search and Seizure-Marijuana Sniffing Dogs
RECENT CASES

Court held in State ex rel. McCurley v. Hanna,42 a companion case to
Stanhope, that trial courts have inherent authority to adjudicate civil contempt proceedings in cases concerning nonpayment of maintenance or
support. There is no apparent reason, therefore, why Stanhope should not
be extended to proceedings not initiated pursuant to the statutory
provision.
CHRISTOPHER

F. JONES

SEARCH AND SEIZURE-MARIJUANA
SNIFFING DOGS
United States v. Bronsteini
On July 26, 1974, two men separately purchased airline tickets from
San Diego, California to Windsor, Connecticut. Each man carried two
identical suitcases of approximately equal size, shape, and weight. Although the men appeared to act as strangers when buying the tickets, they
were subsequently seen talking together. This behavior was observed by an
airline ticket agent. The agent's suspicions being aroused, he notified the
Drug Enforcement Agency (hereinafter cited as D.E.A.) in San Diego. The
D.E.A. agent, "who had previous experience with the ticket agents and
found them to be reliable informants .. ,"2 called the Hartford, Connecticut office of the D.E.A. and informed them of the suspicions of the airline
ticket agent. The D.E.A. office in Hartford alerted the Connecticut State
Police unit at the airport. When the flight from San Diego arrived at the
airport, about fifty pieces of luggage were lined up. Meisha, a "canine
cannabis connoisseur", 3 nosed at the seams of two suitcases, then bit and
ripped them. The defendants were each seen picking up one of these bags
and both were arrested. The defendants consented to the officer's request
to open their luggage. Two hundred forty pounds of marijuana were
found in the luggage.
The defendants' motion to suppress the marijuana seized in the warrantless search was denied. They appealed the denial to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals contending that-the use of the marijuana sniffing dog
constituted an illegal search and seizure within the protection of the fourth
only in cases in which payments have been ordered to be made to the circuit court
clerk. However, trial courts may at any time, upon their own motion or the motion
of one of the parties, order that payments be so made.
42. 535 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
1. 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975).
2. 529 F.2d at 460.
3. Id.
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amendment. 4 The second circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that
there was no search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
To support its holding the court relied upon UnitedStates v. Fulero.5 In
Fulero the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals flatly rejected the
contention that the use of a marijuana sniffing dog was a search. The value
of Fulero was limited because the court rejected the defendant's contention
as being "frivolous" without discussion or citation of authority. The Bronstein court supplied the logic and authority that Fulero lacked.
The court first cited the "plain view" doctrine as support for its
conclusion that the use of a marijuana sniffing dog was not a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. The central concept of this doctrine is that if an officer sees evidence or contraband while in a place where
he has a right to be, he has not conducted a search within the meaning of
7
the fourth amendment.6 The doctrine has been extended to "plain smell."1
The Bronstein court reasoned that because the marijuana was within the
dog's "plain smell," the defendant's fourth amendment rights were not
violated.8 The major conceptual problem with this conclusion is that the
officers themselves could not have detected the odor of the marijuana. The
court stated that if the officers had smelled the marijuana it would not have
been a search. The court perceived no constitutionally significant differ9
ence in the dog's smelling of the marijuana. However, when magnometers
and x-ray machines are used to aid an officer in detecting objects they are
held to be a search.' 0 The court reasoned that if there had been no search,
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.

5. 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
6. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446 (1971); Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
7. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Taylor v. United States, 286
U.S. 1 (1932). See also United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Martinex-Mira-Montes, 494 F.2d 808 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974).
8. 521 F.2d at 461. The court cited no case law to support this view. "Since
the dogs have not yet at least been trained to talk, their response to the presence of
the drug is conveyed by nosing along the seams.. . and then ripping and biting at
the bags . . .[I]t cannot be sensibly characterized as a search or seizure." 521 F.2d
at 462.
9. A magnometer is a device used to determine the presence of metal. It is
commonly used in airport searches.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3rd Cir. 1972); United States v.
Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972).
The Bronstein court purports to distinguish the search by a magnometer from
that of a marijuana sniffing dog. Meisha, it points out, has never falsely identified a
substance whereas the magnometer will be set off by the presence of any metal and
will "willy nilly lead to the body or bag search." The constitutional basis of the
court's logic is unclear. Is it suggesting that because a method of search is accurate
or reliable it is no longer a search? The constitutional violation is in the search, not in
the finding or failure to find.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/10
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there could be no violation of defendants' fourth amendment rights.11
The court further supported its view by analogy to cases in which
evidence seen by an officer with the aid of a flashlight or binoculars is held
to be within his "plain view."1 2 The analogy is not convincing because these
cases have been limited to their facts.'" Furthermore, the use of a dog's
sense of smell would seem more analogous to the use of a magnometer
than to a flashlight or binoculars.
The question of whether a person has fourth amendment rights in a
particular situation depends upon whether there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy."' 4 The test is not simply a subjective one of an individual
knowing that someone is observing him. Rather, the test of "reasonable
expectation" must involve judicial evaluations of society's view of what
circumstances entitle an individual to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Thus, a person talking on a public phone has a reasonable expectation that
his conversation is not being monitored. If that same individual was shooting heroin in the phone booth he would not have the same reasonable
expectation of privacy.' 5
The use of a flashlight and binoculars had been held to be within the
"plain view" doctrine before the Katz v. United States formulation of a
7
reasonable expectation of privacy. 16 Continued acceptance since Katz'
11. An issue not dealt with herein was defendant's argument that Meisha was
not sufficiently accurate to allow a search utilizing the dog's sense of smell. Defendants argued that Meisha was only 50% accurate because she had missed two of their
bags which also contained marijuana. The court pointed out that it is not constitutionally significant that Meisha missed bags, but that it might have been significant
if Meisha had identified bags as containing marijuana which in fact did not.
Even if the defendants could have shown false identifications by Meisha, their
impact on the prosecution's case is doubtful in light of the magnometer cases. A
search by a magnometer is justified because of the danger of passengers carrying
concealed weapons and yet by design it will be set off by any metal object. See cases
cited footnote 10 supra.
12. The court's analogy seems to be that these are common items used by the
public, and their use is not considered a search. See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563 (1927); United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974); United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Cobb v. Wyrick, 379 F. Supp. 1287, 1292
n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
13. Id. Note also that the magnometer and x-ray case cited in note 10 supra
hold that the use of these devices are a search within the fourth amendment. It
follows that these cases hold that the use of the magnometer or x-ray machine is not
within the plain view doctrine. This suggests a refusal by the courts to expand the
plain view doctrine to allow it to cover situations where an officer has a "view" of
some evidence only with the aid of an external instrumentality.
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). If an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy then the use of a device to bring something within the
view of the officer will not be in his plain view.
15. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.R. 349
(1974) in which these concepts and this analogy are fully developed.
16. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927). See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 437 (1967).
17.by University
See cases ofcited
noteSchool
11 supra.
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indicates a judgment by the courts that if evidence can be seen with the use
of a light or binoculars, one is not entitled to a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 18
The cases which have held there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
can be distinguished from those holding to the contrary. There is a reasonable expectation of privacy when the individual places himself in a situation
where a physical barrier protects the object searched or seized from perception. To entitle a person to a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
barrier has to be capable of shielding the object from normal sense perception. 19 Under this analysis, the use of a marijuana sniffing dog would seem
to be a search. There was no contention in Bronstein that the officers
smelled the marijuana through the walls of the suitcase. The use of a dog is
not just a case of an accepted or commonplace amplification of the officer's
own sense of smell. The use of Meisha properly would seem to be a search
within the guidelines of Katz.
The court's contention that the use of the dog was not a search raises
startling implications. If detection of the odor of marijuana by a dog is
within "plain view," then law enforcement agencies can use the dog's sense
of smell indiscriminately without any fourth amendment limitations as to
reasonableness, so long as the officer is in a place where he has a right to be.
The Bronstein court purports to deny this implication. It stated that under
the circumstances presented, the use of Meisha posed no justifiable constitutional concern.20 The limitation imposed by the court was that the
officers had "ample cause" 21 to use Meisha. The constitutional basis of this
limit is unclear. The fourth amendment requires reasonableness or probable cause for a search or seizure. However, the Bronstein court held that
the use of a marijuana sniffing dog was not a search.2 2 This being the case,
the fourth amendment would seem to provide no protection.
The Bronstein court further justified its conclusion that the use of a
marijuana sniffing dog was not a search on the ground that there "can be
no reasonable expectation of privacy when one transports luggage by plane
.... ,,23
The court relied upon Katz. The Supreme Court stated in Katz
that, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public may
be constitutionally protected." 24 The Bronstein court's assertion that one
who consigns his luggage to a common carrier has no expectation of
18. Cobb v. Wyrick, 379 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
19. This principle is no more than an empirical synthesis of the cases decided.
In the final analysis, each case represents a separate evaluation.
20. 521 F.2d at 463.
21. Id. at 461.
22. Id. at 462.
23. Id.

24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967). Note that this is in essence
a restatement of the plain view doctrine.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/10
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privacy is doubtful. 25 In United States v. Edwards26 the court stated that
anti-skyjacking searches must be "reasonable" within the boundaries of the
fourth amendment. Thus, Edwards must have found that a passenger has
27
some expectation of privacy with respect to his checked luggage.
The better reasoned view is that the use of a marijuana sniffing dog is
a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. This does not solve
the problem in Bronstein because the fourth amendment only prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures." Cases agree that the reasonableness
of a warrantless search 28 implies the use of a balancing process.2 9 The
disagreement is the manner in which the balancing is to take place.
Katz30 involved the use by police of a hearing device attached to the
outside of a public telephone booth. After determining that this constituted
a search within the protection of the fourth amendment, "the Court proceeded to require the same justification for the surveillance as would be
required before an officer could go barging into Katz's bedroom." 31 If such
an approach were taken in Bronstein the validity of a search would be
32
doubtful.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Garay, 477 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d
509 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 902 (1974).
26. 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974).
27. Id. at 500.
28. A question not to be dealt with here is whether the D.E.A. agents should
have obtained a warrant. In United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974)
the court held that even where agents had what might have been probable cause to
believe that a passenger on an airplane was carrying illegal drugs, the agent "should
have impounded the luggage and presented his facts to a magistrate." Query as to
the validity of this holding in light of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), in
which the Supreme Court approved a warrantless search of an automobile where
the alternative was impounding the car. In United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325
(C.D. Cal. 1975) the court held that the use of a marijuana sniffing dog was a search
within the fourth amendment, and that the officers should have obtained a search
warrant first.
It should be noted that the flight time from San Diego to Connecticut is
approximately 9 hours. This would be sufficient time to appear before a magistrate
without having to impound the luggage.
29. This is the reasoning process used in justifying anti-skyjacking devices.
See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Albardo, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3rd
Cir. 1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972). For a general
overview of the area see Note, The Antiskyjack System: A Matterof Searchor Seizure, 48
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 1261 (June 1973).
30. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L.R. 349, 388
(1974).
32. In this respect recall that the ticket agent and the D.E.A. men had no
evidence that a particular crime had been committed. The record does not show
that the defendants were known drug sellers or users. All that was known about the
two men was that they bought tickets from San Diego to Connecticut separately,
were later seen talking together, and each carried two suitcases of approximately
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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In contrast to the approach in Katz is the line of cases beginning with
Terry v. Ohio.3 3 Whereas Katz suggested a single threshold fourth amendment standard, Terry suggested a sliding scale. s4 The Supreme Court in
Terry stated that the need to search should be balanced against the extent
of invasion. In making the assessment of whether a search is unreasonable,
the standard is to be an objective one. "[W]ould the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the . . . search warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. 3 5 Such an
approach allows the definition of "reasonable" to change as the seriousness
of the intrusion and society's interest change. The skyjacking cases are
decided precisely upon this analysis.36 All passengers are searched by the
magnometer before they board, irrespective of probable cause. Such a
procedure could not stand up under a fourth amendment approach which
allowed one standard of reasonableness. The procedure has been approved because the prevention of skyjacking is an extremely important
societal interest3 7 and a limited degree of intrusion is involved in such
searches.
In determining the- reasonableness of a search, there is a significant
difference between a magnometer search and the search involved in Bronstein. In Bronstein the search was made after arrival of the airplane at its
destination. The marijuana in Bronstein was found in a search for drugs
and was not incidental to a search to prevent skyjacking. Thus, the repeatedly emphasized justification of preventing a skyjacking was not involved in Bronstein. On the other hand it is at least arguable that the degree
of intrusion is greater in a magnometer search because it is less selective
than the use of a marijuana sniffing dog.
Judge Mansfield adopted a balancing approach in his concurring
opinion in Bronstein. In balancing society's interest against the individual's
interest, Judge Mansfield saw two factors as being important: (1) the
defendants had consigned their baggage to a common carrier and therefore their reasonable expectation of privacy was reduced; and (2) the
D.E.A. agent had some "reasonable grounds to suspect the presence of
contraband." Therefore, Mansfield said it was not unreasonable "to permit
use of external method or device to determine whether the baggage.
38
contained contraband.
equal size, weight and shape. These facts would seem too commonplace to warrant
a full search and/or seizure.
33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34. Id. at 21-22. Note that Amsterdam, in his article, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L.R. 349, 390-95 (1974), discusses this interpretation of
Terry, but ultimately rejects the conclusion that it is the law today.
35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Alsando, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
37. Id.
38. 521 F.2d at 464.
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